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Recently, the question of whether Chinese academia should construct its own 
“zhuyi” (-isms)1 or not has been given great attention by some Chinese and 
Western scholars.2 In the discussion, several Chinese scholars, such as profes-
sor Wang Jianjiang at Shanghai Normal University, are eager to construct a new 
** This study is supported by the National Social Science Program (17CZX027).
1 In modern Chinese, “zhuyi” has multiple meanings, such as, “the main idea,” “a systema-
tized thought on the world, society and academic problem,” “thinking model,” “regime, 
economic system,” etc. Cf. Ci Hai, (Shanghai: Shanghai Ci Shu Press, 1999), p. 3028. In 
some contexts, the significance of “zhuyi” is close to “philosophy,” “theory,” and “thou-
ght” in English. We use this word to highlight the multicultural perspective and goals of 
the construction of “zhuyi” in current Chinese academia. 
2 There have been a number of papers, international conferences and workshops on the 
topic, such as Aleš Erjavec, “Zhuyi: From Absence to Bustle, Some Comments on Jianji-
ang Wang’s Article ‘The Bustle and the Absence of Zhuyi,’” Exploration and Free Views, 
No. 9 (2016), pp. 75–80; Wang Jianjiang, “The Bustle and Absence of Zhuyi,” Filozofski 
vestnik, XXXVII, No. 1 (2016), pp. 157–178; Aleš Erjavec, “Some Additional Remarks Con-
cerning Issues Opened by Prof. Wang Jianjiang,” AM Journal of Art and Media Studies, 
No. 13 (2017), pp. 143–147; Aleš Erjavec, “Trivial Truths Related to Further Comments 
on the Absence of Zhuyi,” in Bie-modern Art and Theory International Academic Con-
ference, July, 2017; Ernest Ženko, “Lesson in Equality: Some Remarks on the Develop-
ment of Chinese Aesthetics,” Journal of Northwest Normal University, 54, No. 5 (2017), 
pp. 23–28; Keaton Wynn, “Differing Modernisms: Similar Art, Different Meaning Zhuyi 
for a Bie-modern Age,” Art Theory Innovation in Bie-modern Era, September 2016; “From 
Postmodern to Bie-modern,” Shanghai Culture, No. 8 (2017), pp. 61–68; Rok Benčin, “Re-
marks on Philosophical ‘Moments,’ on the Aesthetics of Emancipation,” Bie-modern Art 
and Theory International Academic Conferences, July, 2017; Wang Jianjiang, “The Appeal 
and Construction of Zhuyi,” Exploration and Free Views, No. 12 (2014), pp. 72–77; “Bie-
modern: Beyond Aesthetic and after Post-modern,” Journal of Shanghai Normal Univer-
sity (Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition) 44, No. 1 (2015), pp. 5–14; “Quadrilateral in 
Philosophy, Aesthetics and Humanities and Bie-modernism: Comments in Aleš Erjavec,” 
Exploration and Free Views, No. 9 (2016), pp. 80–86; “The Space of Heroes and the Hero 
Games,” Chinese Journal of Literary Criticism, No. 2 (2017), pp. 39–47; Bie-modern: Space 
Encounter and Times Spans (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 2017). There are also a 
number of international meetings focusing on the topic, such as Art: Pre-modern, Mod-
ern, Post-modern and Bie-modern, held by the Center for Chinese Bie-Modern Studies 
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philosophical model in China’s own discourse. Some European scholars admit 
that Chinese scholars have many quite persuasive insights and that contem-
porary Chinese visual art has been successfully integrated into global visual 
art circles, but they still insist the opportunity for China to conceive of its own 
“zhuyi” has not arrived yet. According to some Western researchers’ opinions, 
Chinese scholars’ expectation that “Chinese aesthetics will be developed to the 
same extent as the Western” cannot completely meet the actual need in China’s 
present-day academia.3 In other words, there is indeed an absence of “zhuyi,” 
original philosophy, and aesthetics in China, but this does not mean Chinese 
aestheticians or philosophers must bustle to propose their own “zhuyi.”
I think Western scholars’ queries have two reasons. Firstly, in the context of glo-
balization and transnational academia, to call for a national “-ism” or “zhuyi” 
may raise the suspicion of “nationalism” or “fundamentalism.” Secondly, the 
given international academic circle or “republic of letters” has a set of rigorous 
conventions and terminology.
Therefore, conceptions or ideas with national characteristics may not be ac-
cepted by the international academic community. Accordingly, if a thought or 
discourse wants to find a place in the international academia, it should share 
“speech” otherwise, it is just a meaningless “voice.”
This distinction of “voice” and “speech” mentioned above is not just a sim-
ple metaphor, but a typical thinking model adopted by a substantial part of 
Western scholars when they talk about non-Western thought. This model can 
be traced back to Aristotle, who discusses the beginning of politics in Politics:
Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal 
whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And where as mere sound is but 
an indication of pleasure or pain and is therefore found in other animals (for 
their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation 
of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set 
(CCBMS) and Georgia Southwestern State University, October, 2017; and Art Theory Inno-
vation in Bie-modern Era, held by Shanghai Normal University, September 2016.
3 Aleš Erjavec, “Trivial Truths Related to Further Comments on the Absence of Zhuyi,” in 
Bie-modern Art and Theory International Academic Conference, July 2017.
221
surpassing the “speech / voice distinction”
forth the expedient and inexpedient, and likewise the just and unjust. And it is 
a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and 
unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family 
and a state. (1253a)4
In Aristotle’s text, the distinction between “speech” and “voice” is not only a 
remarkable difference between human and animal but also a powerful symbol 
for the expedient and inexpedient, the just and unjust, the comprehensible and 
incomprehensible. This distinction is given much attention by contemporary 
French philosopher Jacques Rancière. According to Rancière, in the context of 
Western political philosophy, any voice which may encroach on speech’s own 
privilege will be expelled from a social community because such an animal 
voice will “introduce trouble into the logos and into its political realization as 
analogia of parts of the community.”5 To maintain a proper “analogia,” a given 
community will adopt a set of “police” strategies for punishing those move-
ments or thoughts that will pose threats to certain rules.6
As we see, this distinction between speech and voice is also a “police strate-
gy” in the Western academic community in a deeper way. Once non-Western 
thought is accepted by the Western academic community or “republic of let-
ters,” it will change the constant “analogia” of the given community, which 
many Western scholars try very hard to avoid. Some scholars compare Western 
and non-Western cultures to prove the superiority of “speech.” However, sup-
posing a thought is an instance of meaningless and incomprehensible “voice,” 
how can comparative study be possible in the first place?
In this essay, I want to discuss the above questions. I will inquire into the dou-
ble meaning of the concept “Chinese philosophy,” the inherent structure of the 
4 Aristotle, Politics, translated by Benjamin Jowett, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885, p. 4.
5 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, translated by Julie Rose, Minne-
apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 22.
6 The terms “analogia” and “police” are both important concepts in Rancière’s philosophy. 
“Analogia” comes from the ancient Greek “ana-logos,” which means “proportion” and 
“analogy.” Rancière uses this term for discussing speech’s proportion which is arranged 
by “logos” in a given community. In Rancière’s text, “police” means a set of rules, inclu-
ding language, social system, ethical and aesthetic standards, etc. that are shared by all 
the people in a given community. Any consciousness or movement which breaks the rule 
will be refuted or punished by the “police.”
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“speech / voice distinction,” and its operational model. I will also observe vari-
ous ways of surpassing this distinction. After that, I will introduce Bie-modern 
(Doubtful Modernity) theory in order to find a solution to the “speech / voice 
distinction” problem. 
Speech or Voice? Double Signification of the Concept “Chinese 
Philosophy”
Interestingly, as early as 1900s, when they began to discuss whether China’s 
traditional thought could be viewed as philosophy or not, Chinese scholars 
have adopted a model of thinking similar to that of the “speech / voice distinc-
tion.” Wang Guowei, a crucial person in the process of the modernization of 
the Chinese academic world, argued that “philosophy” is indeed contained in 
Chinese traditional thought. He also believed that the research field of philos-
ophy is to deal with the universal issue of the human being rather than that of 
a given nation. Since the Chinese is a part of humankind, China certainly has 
had its own philosophy.7 Because of the remarkable consistency of their research 
objects, traditional Chinese thought is the same as Western philosophy. It seems 
that Wang Guowei’s convincing argument not only ends the discussion “whether 
Chinese has philosophy or not” but also sharply suggests the question itself is 
irrational. Besides Wang Guowei, this way to stop the argument about “Chinese 
Philosophy” is also adopted by many influential scholars, such as Hu Shi, Feng 
Youlan, Zhang Dainian, etc. They all admitted there are plenty of differences be-
tween Chinese and Western philosophy, but they also believed that these differ-
ences are the result of history and culture rather than of race or nation. 
However, a cultural fundamentalist may claim that, since “philosophy” has 
been a part of traditional Chinese disciplines, it is unnecessary to introduce 
Western philosophy into China. To respond to those who despised the Western 
academic world, some founders of Chinese philosophy engaged in inquiring 
into the difference between Chinese thought and Western philosophy in order 
to construct Chinese philosophy according to Western standards. For example, 
Yan Fu, who translated many Western important writings, believed Western ac-
7 Wang Guowei, Selected Essay about Philosophy and Aesthetics, Shanghai: East China Nor-
mal University Press, 1999, p. 4.
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ademic thought is theorized and systematized, while Chinese academic is just a 
rough summation of experience.8 Cai Yuanpei, a great educator, clearly stated,
Traditional Chinese academic is never systematically integrated and therefore 
it cannot be viewed as “science” or “discipline” in modern sense. The urgent 
task for Chinese scholars is to construct systemized Chinese philosophy and aes-
thetics by referring to the Western academic form. To complete this work, one 
must be familiar with the Western academic standard and must have profoundly 
studied the history of Western philosophy.9
We can see there are two paradoxical answers to “whether the Chinese have 
philosophy” given by Wang Guowei and Cai Yuanpei respectively. The two com-
peting attitudes clearly reveal the double signification of the term “Chinese phi-
losophy.” On the one hand, according to Wang Guowei, and similarly to Western 
philosophy, traditional Chinese academics also deal with general issues that 
cannot be replaced by any Western thought. On the anther hand, Chinese ac-
ademia lacks a rigorous way to express such valuable thoughts. A theorized 
and systemized “Chinese philosophy,” which is close to the West, is not yet 
established. Obviously, Wang Guowei’s answer focuses on the field, while Cai 
Yuanpei views “philosophy” as a discipline, i.e., as a thinking model and a way 
of academic study, whose standards must refer to those of the West. If we view 
Wang Guowei and Cai Yuanpei’s ideas in the perspective of the “speech / voice 
distinction,” we can summarize their opinions in the following way: ancient 
Chinese thought possesses valuable “voice,” but it does not comprise under-
standable “speech,” because it does not meet the requirements of “modern aca-
demic” standards, that is, those of “Western academia.” To this extent, the con-
ception of “Chinese philosophy” is a curious mixture of “voice” and “speech.”
Proposing the conception of “Chinese philosophy” is an important event in the 
development history of Chinese academic activity. It reveals that Chinese schol-
ars have realized the defect of ancient academia and have attempted to restore 
traditional Chinese thought in an international perspective. From this time on, 
Chinese thought is not isolated but a part of “world philosophy.” In this respect, 
8 Yan Fu, Collected Essays, Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 1986, p. 52.
9 Cai Yuanpei, Collected Essays, Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 1984, p. 188.
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an intrinsic connotation of “Chinese philosophy” is internationalism rather 
than nationalism.
The double signification of “Chinese philosophy” also reveals Chinese schol-
ars’ complex attitude toward their academical tradition. Firstly, modern Chinese 
scholars have realized that it is necessary to consider the relationship between 
Chinese academia and the international academic community. Secondly, 
“Chinese philosophy” is not just an academic conception but also the transfor-
mation of the Chinese research paradigm. To construct the discipline of “Chinese 
philosophy” means the creation of a new type of academic “speech.” For modern 
Chinese scholars to demonstrate the value of traditional Chinese thought, it is 
crucial to transform traditional academic discourse from “voice” into “speech” 
by referring to the standards of the West. Many modern Chinese scholars have 
devoted themselves to completing this transformation, but it seems they ignore 
a potential problem if Chinese thought is expressed in a Western style, is it still 
Chinese philosophy?
The “Speech / Voice Distinction”: A Self-Deconstruction System
Although Chinese scholars have claimed that philosophy should be an indis-
pensable part of the international republic of letters, the validity of Chinese 
philosophy has remained a controversial problem for Western academia. When 
Western scholars discuss whether Chinese thought can be considered a “phi-
losophy” or not, the distinction between speech and voice has proven to be a 
typical thinking model adopted by some Western scholars.
Take the early Jesuits to visit China, for example. As culture disseminators, 
Jesuits translated many Confucian classics and other works of Chinese tradi-
tional thought. In their travels, letters, and academic writings, we can find two 
contradictory attitudes toward China. On the one hand, China is described as a 
civilized country whose political institutions are highly efficient and even per-
fect. On the other hand, some Jesuits considered Chinese thought to be a mean-
ingless “voice” that is short of logic and value, whereas Western philosophy, es-
pecially Christian thought, is systemized and valuable. In his journals of China, 
Matteo Ricci commented on Chinese moral philosophy as being comprised of 
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various maxims and unreliable legends.10 Eusèbe Renaudot straightforwardly 
claimed there is no “Erste Philosophie” (first philosophy) in China at all.11 
It seems that it was the Jesuit movement in which communication between 
Western and Chinese philosophy began, and this should have led to an interna-
tional philosophy. However, this “comparative philosophy” implies the think-
ing model of the speech / voice distinction. According to the Jesuits, Chinese 
traditional thought is just incomprehensible and valueless “voice,” and com-
paring Western thought with Chinese simply proves the that the former is 
“speech” and naturally superior to Chinese thought. 
On the surface, the above comparative study confirms the rationality of the 
“speech / voice distinction,” but in the process of carrying out the compari-
son, the distinction is considered as being the premise, rather than the conclu-
sion.12 There is no doubt that Chinese classics carried their primary value for 
Chinese scholars and that Chinese traditional academics had their own norms 
and standards.13 However, since the Jesuits had accepted the “speech / voice 
distinction” before comparing the two thoughts, any evidence which could 
prove that Chinese thought is valuable could not be accepted and, in fact, had 
to be concealed. Furthermore, as we have mentioned, the “speech / voice dis-
tinction” is not just an evident mark of difference but a powerful symbol of the 
comprehensible and incomprehensible, etc. For a Jesuit, it is not important to 
find out what is the real specificity of Chinese thought; he only wants to convey 
the impression that Western philosophy is much better than Chinese thought. 
The simplest way to achieve this effect is to claim that Chinese thought is mere-
ly an instance of “voice” that is accordingly unnecessary to study. This case 
suggests that the boundary between voice and speech is not natural but a result 
of ideological construction.
10 Mathew Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Mathew Ricci, translated by 
He Gaoji, Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 1983, p. 31.
11 Jesuits’s Letters on China, vol. 3, edited by Jean Baptiste du Halde, translated by Zhu Jing, 
Zhengzhou: Da Xiang Publishing House, 2001, p. 285.
12 For the point that the act of such comparisons takes the “speech / voice” distinction” as 
a precondition and evidence for the distinction at the same time, see Jacques Rancière, 
Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, pp. 22–23.
13 For example, Dai Zhen and Zhang Xuecheng in the Qing Dynasty proposed a set of rigoro-
us rules for studying, which was accepted by the majority of scholars in that time. 
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However, since Chinese thought cannot be understood (that is to say, no one 
can know what the real meaning of Chinese thought is), how can Jesuits claim 
that Western thought is superior to the Chinese? Interestingly, as soon as some-
one utilizes the “speech / voice distinction” to distinguish between evaluate 
different cultures, he or she has to view “voice” as something understandable at 
once. In other words, before being disparaged, “voice” must first be considered 
as an instance of “speech.” This paradoxical transformation implies that the 
“speech / voice distinction” is an unreasonable and self-deconstructive system. 
The Failure of Ways to Surpass the “Speech / Voice Distinction”
What is the real basis for the “speech / voice distinction”? We may draw some 
inspiration from early Western philosophers. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s let-
ters show that he found it curious whether there was metaphysics in China, and 
he also frankly admitted that “Erste Philosophie” in China was undeveloped. 
In other words, Chinese thought was not entitled to be named “philosophy,” 
because it did not pay attention to the problem of “being.”14 Hegel argued that 
Chinese thought was lower than Western language and that it was not a suit-
able language for studying philosophy.15 Jacques Derrida pointed out that phi-
losophy in its nature was a production of the West, which is related to Western 
language, culture, and history. In dialogue with Wang Yuanhua, a famous con-
temporary scholar, Derrida directly claimed that China did not possess philos-
ophy but only thought.16 Carine Defoort, a contemporary philosopher, insists it 
is a mistake to view Chinese thought as “philosophy” because Chinese thought 
lacks the fundamental and inherent elements of Western philosophy.17 
According to these opinions, if Chinese thought wants to be accepted as “phi-
losophy,” it needs to speak in a Western language and get used to the context of 
Western culture. Language and culture are not only the most serious setbacks 
14 German Thinkers Discussing China, edited by Adrian Hsia, translated by Chen Aizhen etc., 
Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 1995, pp. 8 and 19.
15 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, translated by He Lin, et al., Beijing: 
Commercial Press, 1959, pp. 115–122.
16 Jacques Derrida, Collected Lectures in China, Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation 
Press, 2003, p. 139.
17 Carine Defoort, “Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West, 
51, No. 3 (2001), p. 396.
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for Chinese thought but also the primary “police strategies” in the republic of 
letters. As sentinels, language and culture keep other thought at a distance 
from Western philosophy, which to some extent turns the republic of letters 
into a Western club. In fact, highlighting the elements of “philosophy” as an-
other insidious form of the “speech / voice distinction” denies the possibility of 
two different cultures communicating with each other while keeping their own 
characteristics and independence respectively. 
Many scholars have realized that the above thinking model is harmful for un-
dertaking effective communication between different cultures, for surpassing 
this distinction, and for constructing a real international philosophy. Rein 
Raud points out that “philosophy” can include Eastern thought only if Western 
scholars expand the study field of traditional philosophy.18 However, if we do 
this, we may encounter an embarrassed situation. When we talk about “phi-
losophy”, we may refer to completely different disciplines and therefore drop 
into a “disagreement” situation as Jacques Rancière has put.19 Moreover, once 
non-Western thought is considered as the same as Western “philosophy”, both 
Western and non-Western thought’s unique features will be ignored. In that 
case, non-Western thought is admitted by the republic of letters at the expense 
of its own nature. It proves that expanding the field of philosophy is not a prop-
er solution to the “speech / voice distinction,” because such an expansion only 
strenthtens it.
Some scholars, especially in Chinese academia, think the key to surpass the 
“speech/ voice distinction” is to find various “common principles” between 
Chinese and Western philosophy. For example, Ye Weilian adopts some con-
ceptions, such as, “common principles” and “inner voice” proposed by T. S. 
Eliot,20 and points out that the aim of international philosophy and poetics is 
to find out the basic differences between Western and Chinese culture while 
constructing “common poetics” and “common principles” to promote mutual 
18 Rein Raud, “Philosophies versus Philosophy: In Defense of a Flexible Definition,” Philoso-
phy East and West, 56, No. 4 (2006), p. 624.
19 About the conception of “disagreement,” see Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and 
Philosophy, p. x.
20 T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays, London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1980, p. 22.
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communication.21 He believes this standpoint is so suitable and flexible that it 
will at the same time surpass both fundamentalism and cultural imperialism.
Unfortunately, Ye Weilian’s proposal is no more than a fantasy. For instance, 
let us study the etymology of “principle” or “yuan” (Chinese term signifying 
“origin”). According to etymology, “principle” is the Latin word “principium,” 
which means “the first place and time of conduction.”22 In Chinese, the origi-
nal meaning of “yuan” is “the headstream of river” according to Explanations 
of Simple and Compound Characters, the first Chinese dictionary.23 As we can 
see, both “principle” and “yuan” mean “beginning” and “foundation.” The dif-
ferent “beginnings” or “foundations” (that is, diverse “principles” or “yuan”) 
engender various cultures. In that case, since scholars such as Ye Weilian ad-
mit that cultural difference indeed exists, how can they discover the “common 
principle” between different cultures? This paradox suggests that cultural rela-
tivism and “common principles,” which are both endorsed by Ye Weilian, can-
not get along with each other.
Furthermore, as the beginning of a thing or an event, “principles” or “yuan” 
also conduct and control their followers. To this extent, once someone uses the 
concept “principle” or “yuan,” he or she will construct a hierarchical system, 
such as, mainstream and branch, leaders and followers etc. In that case, it is 
impossible to surpass cultural imperialism by finding out “common principles” 
because such an attempt is just the reason for the establishment of cultural im-
perialism. In this sense, “common principle” is only a potential re-expression 
of the “speech / voice distinction.”
Some scholars try to construct a “good international philosophy” in order to 
solve the conflict between Western and non-Western thought and to promote 
the development of international philosophy. According to American aesthe-
tician Richard Shusterman, a “good international philosophy” has to give up 
cultural, national, and racial specifics so as to deal with the general prob-
21 Ye Weilian, Collected Essays, Hefei: Anhui Education Publishing House, 2002, pp. 1 and 39.
22 Oxford Latin Dictionary, edited by P. G. W. Glare, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968, p. 1459.
23 Xu Shen, Explanations of Simple and Compound Characters, Shanghai: Shanghai Classics 
Publishing House, 1981, p. 569.
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lem of humankind.24 A “good international philosophy” should be based on 
the community of human kind, which will contain various thoughts belong-
ing to diverse cultures. To some extent, this idea can be viewed as a replay of 
Christian “fellowship,” i.e., Goethe’s and Erich Auerbach’s conception of “der 
Weltliteratur” (world literature).25 In the name of “humankind,” it seems there 
is no need to make a distinction between Western and Chinese culture in the 
first place. However, it is quite hard to prove that African-American criticism 
or Jewish diaspora literature has connections with academia in China today. 
Conversely, will a scholar who studies African-American criticism or other lo-
cal cultures be guilty of fundamentalism and in turn be viewed as a “bad inter-
national philosopher” who ought to be excluded from the new republic of let-
ters? If “a good international philosophy” can only deal with the general prob-
lem of humankind without considering a nation’s or ethnicity’s own specificity, 
then there will be no reason for developing a national philosophy. However, 
since a republic of letters is composed of various national philosophies, it will 
necessarily collapse if all regional cultures and national philosophies vanish 
as such. This case suggests that constructing a good international philosophy 
cannot rely on giving up dealing with a particular nation’s own set of problems 
in the name of cultural universals. The “good international philosophy” project 
transforms the “speech / voice distinction” into a nation / world distinction, 
but the nature of Western-centrism is not thereby changed.
Superficially, the project of constructing a “good international philosophy” is 
similar to the proposal of making “world philosophy,” which was proposed 
by Chinese scholars when they prepared to construct “Chinese philosophy” in 
the 1900s, but the two suggestions have different effects. The aim of Chinese 
scholars’ desire for international philosophy is to earn an independent place for 
Chinese traditional thought, while the construction of “good international phi-
losophy” will be at the cost of national philosophy altogether. Furthermore, who 
and how is one to judge which topic can be viewed as a “universal human prob-
lem” and ban in turn be situated in the field of “good international philosophy”? 
24 Richard Shusterman, “Internationalism in Philosophy: Models, Motives and Problems,” 
Metaphilosophy, 28, No. 4 (1997), pp. 290–291.
25 See Erich Auerbach, “Philology and Wetiliteratur,” translated by Jin Chengcheng, Com-
parative Literature and World Literature, No. 1 (2016), pp. 88–96.
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Aleš Erjavec thinks students’ own free will can lead them to find a proper field 
of study. He points out that the mode of operation of academia resembles that 
of the “market economy.” There is an “invisible hand” that masters the distri-
bution and transmission of the realm of philosophy (its topics and methods), 
and a student, no matter what country he or she belongs to, can choose the 
appropriate research field according to his or her own interests. Erjavec thinks 
financial support offered by governments to develop the study of national phil-
osophical programs cannot succeed. He gives the example of Croatia, where 
the government had a project of developing Croatian national philosophy, even 
though “Croatian philosophers wanted to study Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard and 
the like.” He reaches the conclusion that “[governmental] financial support will 
be generated only if such researchers and authors themselves from their own 
free will decide to carry out such agenda.”26 
It seems the “free market of academia” makes students choose freely and gives 
them each an equal right to make their own speech. In this sense, the most pop-
ular philosophical topic will become the “universal problem of the human,” 
making philosophy really international. However, this mode may just disguise 
as an optional choice that is in fact obligatory. Michel Foucault thinks the ex-
ercise of power is a “conduct of conducts” and a management of possibilities. 
Power means not only “confrontation” but also “conduct.”27 By means of the 
“invisible hand,” the free market of philosophy conducts, or (more precisely) 
leads students to choose “freely.” However, as we all know, Western culture is 
mainstream nowadays.
If we completely trust the free market of the academic community, we only 
obtain a set of Western, rather than international, discourses. In fact, those 
non-Western students just follow Western philosophy unconsciously and mis-
take Western topics for the universal study field. Even if the logic of today’s 
academic community is indeed similar to the “free market,” it will alert those 
nations who lack of original thought or “zhuyi” that they must create their own 
discourse and thus fully display their special value. Otherwise, a nation whose 
26 Erjavec, “Zhuyi: From Absence to Bustle, Some Comments on Jianjiang Wang’s Article ‘The 
Bustle and the Absence of Zhuyi,’” p. 78.
27 Michel Foucault, Power, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, et al., 
New York: The New Press, 1997, p. 341.
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“zhuyi” is absent cannot equally trade with others in “the free market of phi-
losophy.”
“Zhuyi” Construction in the Bie-modern (Doubtful Modernity) Era
The above ways to surpass the “speech / voice distinction” are unsuccessful 
because they all consciously or unconsciously admit to the existence of such 
distinction. Firstly, no matter whether we take Rode and his endeavor to ex-
pand the connotation of the term “philosophy,” or Ye Weilian and his attempt 
to discover the “common principle” between Western and Chinese cultures, 
or the disparate efforts to construct “good international philosophy,” none of 
these strategies can avoid setting up a duality that contains speech and voice, 
core and margin, leaders and followers, etc. However, we have explained above 
that the “speech / voice distinction” is based on a self-deconstructing paradox. 
Secondly, surpassing the “speech / voice distinction” does not mean one must re-
nounce distinction as such. On the contrary, the key to surpassing the “speech / 
voice distinction” is to realize that identity cannot be a substitute for diversity. 
It is indeed necessary to make distinctions between different cultures and var-
ious “zhuyi.” When we reject “the East is East and the West is West” (Rudyard 
Kipling, “The Ballad of East and West”), we must also beware of eliminating 
culture difference in the name of identity. Only if a national philosophy blooms 
will a truly international philosophy be constructed that will then transcend 
the “speech / voice distinction.” To this extent, professor Wang Jianjiang’s Bie-
modern (Doubtful Modernity) and other related theories can be viewed as a 
promising way to actualize the prospect of international philosophy.
Wang Jianjaing summarizes the Chinese contemporary social context as 
“Doubtful Modernity,” which is a synthesis composed of the pre-modern, mod-
ern, and post-modern. It is obvious that so called “Bie-modernity” is complete-
ly different from Western “modernity.” This typological difference suggests that 
it is useless to simply repeat Western conception of modernity if one wants to 
solve Chinese contemporary problems. In Bie-Modern: Behind the Creation of 
Discourse, Wang Jianjiang points out that because all the problems in a nation 
have a close relationship with the current social situation, an academic must 
have specific historical features in a given time. Since contemporary China can-
not be classified as having “Western modernity,” what Chinese philosophy and 
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aesthetics focus on is not the problem of the Western modern or post-modern, 
but rather a special issue, that is, the “Bie-modern,” or “Doubtful Modernity.”28
However, the conception of “Doubtful Modernity” (Bie-modern) does not mean 
that China has left the process of modernization. On the contrary, the purpose 
of Bie-modernism is to surpass the Bie-modern by pursuing the authenticity 
of modernity and then reaching an ideal social and academic situation. To 
achieve this goal, “Bie-modernity” contains various original and convincing 
theories, such as, time spatialization and the four-period development theory, 
the theory of the great-leap-forward pause, and Sino-West-Marxism-I (“Chinese 
traditional philosophy, Western philosophy, Marxism and I”).29 In short, what 
Bie-modernism is in pursuit of is the deterrence of the pseudo-modern and the 
establishment of real modernity. 
The “real modernity” here means highlighting the subjectivity of Chinese philos-
ophy by “bie,” that is, finding out the difference between Chinese and Western 
consciously, surpassing current hybrid social situations, and arriving at a new 
type of modernity. To this extent, “Bie-modern” or “Doubtful Modernity” is not 
only a new “word” but also a new “practice,” one that can be employed to un-
derstand China’s specific social and cultural situation, which can in turn be 
especially beneficial for Chinese scholars constructing their own Chinese ac-
ademic discourse, that is, “zhuyi.” Furthermore, although “bie” is the goal of 
the “Bie-modern,”30 it does not deny the value of other cultures. Consequently, 
there is no distinction, such as that between “speech and voice” or “center and 
margin,” in the context of the “Bie-modern.” The guarded “threshold” of the 
international academic community is replaced by a communicative “bridge,” 
which will be a platform for dialogue and open for all kinds of “zhuyi.” We can 
take the conception “leap-forward pause,” for example, to reveal Bie-modern 
28  Wang Jianjiang, “Bie-Modern: Behind the Creation of Discourse,” Shanghai Culture, No. 12 
(2015), pp. 5–23.
29 Wang Jianjiang, “Introduction of ‘Bie-modern’ Theory,” Bie-modern: Space Encounter and 
Times Spans, Beijing: Social Science Press, 2017, p. 1.
30 “Bie” is the core idea in the theory of “Bie-modern.” In modern Chinese, “bie” has mul-
tiple meanings. Literally, it means “not,” “farewell,” or “wrongly written words”; more 
implicitly, it refers to “awkward,” “another,” etc. In “Bie-modern” theory, “bie” is a way of 
thinking, which means to pursues original ideas, creative discourse, and subjective aware-
ness. Although it tries to find differences and make distinctions, it is not restricted to those 
“bie” but attempts to transcend them. 
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theory’s “bie” (distinguishing) and “jie” (borrowing). To adapt the special 
social circumstances, Bie-modern proposes the “leap-forward pause,” which 
means stopping and reflecting on the current stage of development from the 
position of the future.31 According to this theory, the present is integrated in 
the same space with the past, future, and different times. It is obvious that the 
“leap-forward pause” theory is a bit similar to Heidegger’s conception of “pro-
ject,” but it is also very different from the Western thinking model. In fact, this 
theory is rooted in Chinese traditional philosophy, especially “Zen” Buddhism. 
This case clearly illustrates that Bie-modern has its own foundation, but it also 
accepts other valuable theories, whether Western or Eastern. The Bie-modern 
has its own core idea based on Chinese traditional thought and current social 
situation, but it does not need to be restricted to a particular national perspec-
tive. The Bie-modern and its theories are not another version of nationalism or 
fundamentalism but rather an open and inclusive system. 
As an original theory, the Bie-modern has its own appeal for constructing a real 
international philosophy and refusing the pseudo-modern. From China’s new 
cultural movement up to now, many scholars claim it is necessary for China to 
abandon its own tradition if it wants to arrive in modern society quickly.32 In 
fact, such a claim is a typical phenomenon in the Bie-modern. Because pres-
ent-day China is a synthesis of pre-modern, modern, and post-modern, some 
people, in trying to transform society into a real modern sociality, mistake the 
traditional for the past. They attempt to transform Chinese into world by way of 
completely imitating the West. However, is that possible? 
Let us take the translation of the term “philosophy” as an example. From the 
start Western missionaries, such as Giulio Aleni, François Furtado and Cai 
Yuanpei, translated the term “philosophy” as “li xue” (studying various objects 
and phenomena to acquire knowledge), “ai zhi xue” (love knowledge) and “hao 
xue” (“love learning,” an allusion to the Analects).33 These translations do not 
only transform the Western word into Chinese, but also change philosophy’s 
31 Wang Jianjiang, “Bie-modern: Leap over Pause,” Exploration and Free Views, No. 12 (2015), 
pp. 9–14.
32 This opinion can be found in many thinkers in the May 4th Movement, such as Lu Xun. See 
Complete Works of Lu Xun, Beijing: People’s Literature Publishing House, 2005, p. 45.
33 About the history of the translation of “philosophy,” see Chen Qiwei, “History of the Chi-
nese Translation of Philosophy,” World Philosophy, No. 3 (2001), pp. 60–68.
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original connotation in its native culture. This case suggests that the foreign 
conception, in the process of translation, cannot maintain the same meaning it 
has in its original culture. 
The same situation also exists in Western philosophy. When we summarize 
Western thought as a “republic of letters,” we often neglect that it contains the 
tone of German, French, and English along with different research paradigms, 
such as continental philosophy and Anglo-American philosophy. Hegel never 
worries that the word “Philosophie” has deviated from the original meaning 
of “φιλοσοφία” when he proposes to “let philosophy speak German.” Hegel be-
lieves that, although it was created by the ancient Greeks, philosophy cannot 
completely meet the needs of the development of German thought at his time. 
To this extent, “philosophie” is Germany’s own discourse rather than that of 
the city-states of ancient Greece.
Hegel successfully made “φιλοσοφία” with a “German style”. This case may 
inspire us to believe that introducing Western culture does not mean that we 
must assimilate or eliminate China’s own culture. The question is not whether 
we should discard “Chinese style” by referring to Western thought or rely on 
Chinese thought exclusively, but rather how we are to construct our own style. 
I think Bie-modern’s “Sino-West-Marxism-I” theory may be a promising model. 
The importance of “Sino-West-Marxism-I” theory has to do with the function 
of “I”. Firstly, when a student integrates theories, he or she will bring his or 
her own understanding and experience into the theory, which will make it into 
something new, just as we saw in the example of the translation of the term 
“philosophy” above. Secondly, no matter how many theories are introduced, 
a nation must have its own discourse and solve its own problems. Although 
Chinese philosophical discourse takes the construction of international phi-
losophy as its ultimate aim, it must be based on the native current context at 
first. In the context of the Bie-modern, what Chinese philosophical discourse 
must do is to surpass the situation of mere juxtapostion and to integrate other 
cultures into the Chinese-style system. The judgment of the structure of “Sino-
Western-Marxism-I” responds precisely to this requirement. Thirdly, because of 
the introduction of Western knowledge, the traditional Chinese context does not 
exist as it did in its original situation. On the one hand, Marxism and Western 
modern philosophy have found a new way to develop their theories. In other 
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words, there is no need to have complete opposition between Chinese tradition-
al philosophy, Western philosophy, and Marxism, nor do we have to use the first 
three to hinder or eliminate “I”, nor are we required to mix all of them together 
into a jumbled mess; rather, the obligation is to discard this paradox, highlight 
the individuality and originality of “I.” “Sino-Western-Marxism” is not simply a 
combination of three thoughts, but rather a synthesis, the construction of which 
must depend on the subjective consciousness and innovative spirit of the re-
searchers themselves. In “Sino-West-Marxism-I” theory, there is no distinction 
of “core and margin” or “leader and follower” among Chinese traditional phi-
losophy, Western philosophy, and Marxism, because researchers themselves 
can integrate various thoughts and construct an open system. To this extent, 
“Sino-West-Marxism-I” theory can not only successfully surpass the “voice / 
speech distinction” but also conceive of a kind of international philosophy.
Because of Bie-modern theory’s independence, inclusiveness and pursuit of 
real modernity, it is attaining contemporary international influence. Georgia 
Southwestern State University (GSW) has established the Center for Chinese Bie-
Modern Studies (CCBMS) to study and apply Bie-modern theory. Well-known 
European academic journals have devoted special columns to Bie-modernism. 
There have been four Bie-modern international academic conferences held in 
America and China respectively. Bie-modernism and its theory have been re-
corded in the Chinese Aesthetic Association State of the Discipline Report, and 
the series of works on this topic have been formally published by the China 
Social Sciences Press. At the same time, more and more artists illustrate their 
Bie-modern propositions by works and their own creative manifestos, which 
reveals a positive interactive relationship between artistic creation and art the-
ory. Moreover, some scholars study the relationship between tourism and en-
vironment from the perspective of the Bie-modern, and others even deal with 
problems of economics, law, and linguistics by referring to this theory. Various 
disciplines come together by means of the Bie-modern theory, which not only 
clearly indicates that the study of the Bie-modern has expanded to philosophy, 
aesthetics, art theory, linguistics, literary theory, law, economics, sociology, and 
so on, but also suggests that the Bie-modern has become a thinking model and 
has been accepted by international academia, diverse disciplines, and artists.
We have analyzed the mistake of the “speech / voice distinction” and illus-
trated the advantage of the “Bie-modern” (Doubtful Modernity) in surpassing 
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it. As we can see, there will never exist a philosophy that can separate itself 
from its own national culture, and there is also no natural boundary between 
speech and voice. The Bie-modern era provides us a background to innovate 
discourses, but the way to “make them new” is not just simply to propose some 
conception or term. I think “Bie-modern” (Doubtful Modernity) has given us 
an illuminating model for constructing creative Chinese “zhuyi,” For example, 
in “‘For-non-existence,’ ‘For-being,’ and ‘Yet-for-being,’” Wang Jianjiang sug-
gests using “for-non-existence” and “for-being” to summarize the two antag-
onistic attitudes of constructing local Chinese “isms”. In my opinion, instead 
of an opposition and limitation in viewpoints of whether there are aesthetics 
and literary theories in China in the first place, the issue of “yet-for-being” is 
to ask what is missed in Chinese aesthetics and literary theory in the situation 
of globalization. To solve the problem of “yet-for-being,” it is necessary to un-
dertake a deep analysis of the history of Chinese philosophy and aesthetics, 
to re-interpret traditional conceptions or theories in the contemporary context, 
and to have meaningful interactions with international academia.34 
In short, a valuable Chinese “zhuyi” needs to profoundly rethink the situation 
of contemporary China (that is, the feature of the “Bie-modern”) and to be a 
benefit for deterring the pseudo-modern and pursuing the authenticity of mo-
dernity. At the same, Chinese “zhuyi” needs to be integrated into international 
academia. It cannot be restricted to a national perspective but should promote 
a more open and international philosophy.
34 Wang Jianjiang, “‘For-non-existence,’ ‘For-being,’ and ‘Yet-for-being,’” Academic Monthly, 
No. 10 (2015), pp. 126–135.
